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Abstract 
 
This paper compares the estimates of the two most widely used non-structural models for 
market power measurement in banking, namely the conduct parameter method and the 
revenue test, as applied to a panel of Greek banks over the period 1993-2004. We also 
propose a dynamic reformulation of these models within a panel data context, in order to 
address possible statistical problems associated with the dynamic nature of bank-level data. 
The results suggest that both static methods provide lower estimates of market power 
relative to their dynamic counterparts. Therefore, the inclusion of some dynamics in the 
models, even though it increased estimation complexity, helped to reveal some collusive 
behavior of banks.   
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1. Introduction 
In the banking sector, prudential regulation and competition policy are in many 
respects intertwined, while the soundness and stability of the system may in various ways 
be influenced by the degree of competition and concentration. Enhanced competition may 
have a deleterious impact on stability if it causes banks’ charter value to drop, thus 
reducing the incentives for prudent risk-taking behavior. A more concentrated system, 
inasmuch as it implies the presence of a few relatively large banks, is more likely to display 
a “too big to fail” problem, by which large banks increase their risk exposure anticipating 
the unwillingness of the regulator to let the bank default in the event of insolvency 
problems (Hughes and Mester, 1998). Any market failure, inefficiency, or anticompetitive 
conduct among banks is likely to impose more severe costs throughout the economy than 
would similar defects in many other industries; thus it becomes particularly important to 
understand the causes and consequences of competition in the banking industry. In this 
respect, the first and most important step is the robust estimation of the degree of 
imperfectly competitive conduct. 
Recent trends in empirical industrial organization have popularized the use of non-
structural approaches to measure market power. These approaches, that came to be known 
as the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) models, provide empirically 
implementable techniques for the analysis of non-competitive behavior in production and 
cost structure. The way to these approaches has been paved by a number of forerunners, 
with the two most popular models being those of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), and 
Panzar and Rosse (1987). Bresnahan and Lau (BL), in a line of research termed conduct 
parameter method (CPM) thereafter, parameterize the extent to which firms perceive a 
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distinction between marginal revenue and price. On the other hand, in the Panzar and Rosse 
(PR) model, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices are 
reflected in revenue. In other words, this revenue test (RT) involves estimating a reduced-
form equation relating gross revenue to a vector of input prices and other control variables. 
While each of the two approaches nurtures its own theoretical discourse, they should not be 
viewed as mutually exclusive but, more eclectically, as complementary tests.  
Whereas there is fairly extensive application of these models to banking, there is a 
limited body of work that compares their results. The purpose of this study is to fill this 
gap, using a panel dataset of Greek banks during the period 1993-2004. Furthermore, we 
propose a dynamic reformulation of the static versions of the CPM and the RT within a 
dynamic panel data context. The most common motivation for also using a dynamic 
approach is the statistical importance of accounting for short-run dynamics in the data. 
Further, the formulation solves the inference problem when using non-stationary data 
(Steen and Salvanes, 1999).  Finally, the dynamic nature of the Greek banking industry and 
certain changes in the regulatory environment may bias the resulting implications if only 
static models are considered.  
We present and describe some important dynamic factors of the Greek banking 
sector, such as the patterns of consolidation and concentration, the changes in the 
regulatory framework, and the liberalization process that occurred during the sample 
period. The presence of these factors may lead to different adjustment costs, which in turn 
make static models inadequate. Indeed, the results suggest that both static methods (CPM 
and RT) tend to provide lower estimates of market power compared to their dynamic 
counterparts. In light of recent critiques of the NEIO approach to measuring 
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anticompetitive conduct (e.g. Corts, 1999), this has important implications for public and 
private policy-makers alike.     
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the two theoretical 
non-structural models applied in the current study, and Section 3 is then devoted to the 
analysis of the empirical static and dynamic versions of these models. Section 4 outlines 
the institutional structure of the Greek banking system and offers a discussion on the 
dataset. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical evidence of applying the models to 
the Greek banking sector, while some conclusions are offered in the final section. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided into two major 
streams: structural and non-structural. The structural approach embraces the structure-
conduct-performance and the efficiency hypotheses. These two models investigate, 
respectively, whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behavior among the 
larger banks, resulting in superior market performance, or whether it is the efficiency of 
larger banks that enhances their performance. Although these hypotheses lack formal 
theoretical support by traditional microeconomic theory, they have frequently been 
employed empirically in the banking industry (e.g. Evanoff and Fortier, 1988; Bourke, 
1989).  
However, owing to several deficiencies arising from the application of the structural 
approach,1 developments in industrial organization, as well as the recognition of the need 
to endogenize the market structure, many empirical studies followed a new course. The 
                                                 
1 Among these are the interpretation of the positive relationship between profitability and concentration and 
various other methodological issues (see Bresnahan, 1989).   
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novelty to competition evaluation has emerged under the impulse of the NEIO approach 
(Carlton and Perloff, 2005). This approach, pioneered by Iwata (1974) and strongly 
enhanced by the papers of Bresnahan (1982, 1989), Lau (1982), and Panzar and Rosse 
(1987), tests competition and the use of market power, and stresses the analysis of banks’ 
competitive conduct in the absence of structural measures. Specifically, each of these 
techniques attempts to measure the competitive conduct of banks without explicitly using 
information on the structure of the market.   
The first model, the Iwata model, allows the estimation of conjectural variation 
values for individual banks supplying a homogeneous product in an oligopolistic market 
(Iwata, 1974). This measure, to the best of our knowledge, has been applied to the banking 
industry only once, by Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), for a duopolistic banking market (in 
South Central Pennsylvania).2 They find that banks’ conduct is imperfectly competitive, 
but closer to perfect competition than one would expect, given the very high degree of 
concentration in the market. 
 
2.1. The conduct parameter method (CPM) 
The second model, which has been applied to the banking sector in a number of 
studies, is based on the procedure first suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) and 
further elucidated in Bresnahan’s (1989) survey of the NEIO.3 It requires the estimation of 
a simultaneous-equation model, where a parameter representing the degree of market 
power of firms is included. The basis of the test is the established principle that, in 
equilibrium, profit-maximizing firms will choose prices or quantities such that marginal 
                                                 
2 Applying this model to the banking industry is difficult, particularly where micro data for the cost and 
production structure for homogeneous products are scarce. 
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cost equals their perceived marginal revenue, which coincides with the demand price under 
perfect competition and with the industry’s marginal revenue under perfect collusion. As 
such, the key parameter in this test is interpreted as the extent to which the average firm’s 
perceived marginal revenue schedule deviates from the demand schedule, thus representing 
the degree of market power actually exercised by the firms in the sample. 
In this respect, consider a non-competitive industry in which N banks produce a 
homogeneous output Q, facing a market demand function of the following stylized form: 
Q = D (P, Z, α) + ε                                                                                                                (1) 
where D is the demand function, P is the market price of industry output Q, Z is a vector of 
exogenous variables affecting demand (often including some variable measuring the 
general economic activity), α is the demand parameter vector, and ε is a stochastic 
disturbance. 
On the supply side, the representative bank i, (i {1, 2,…, N}) is assumed to 
maximize profits by solving the following one-shot game in output level: 
∈
max pi qi –  C (qi, ωi)                                                                                                               (2) 
where (for the ith bank), qi is the output level, pi is the respective price imposed, C is the 
cost function (which for now is homogeneous across all banks in the industry), and wi is the 
price vector of inputs. The optimality condition corresponding to this problem is given by 
the following inverse supply relation: 
( , ) ii i
i
qQ PP MC q w Q
q Q Q
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂
= −⎜ ⎟⎜∂ ∂ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠                                                                                       (3) 
where MC is the marginal cost function. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 For a review of these studies see Shaffer (2004). 
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As is evident from the last equation, an integral part of the solution is the elasticity 
concept /
/i i i
dQ Q
dq q
λ ≡ , that is the conjectural variation coefficient of the NEIO literature. As 
λi moves farther from zero, the conduct of bank i moves farther from that of a perfect 
competitor. Thus, the (average) conjectural variation coefficient will reveal what kind of 
imperfectly competitive behavior characterizes the market, and there is no need to impose 
any a priori restriction on it. In other words, it is not necessary to assume a certain conduct 
beforehand and test for its propriety.  
Moreover, in Eq. (3),  represents the semi-elasticity of market demand, 
that is 
( / )Q P Q∂ ∂
( )
/
Qh
Q P
≡
∂ ∂
  , which is a function of aggregate output and other exogenous 
variables (Bresnahan, 1982). Shaffer (1993) describes the banking industry’s marginal 
revenue function as industry price P plus ( )h   . Yet, a bank’s perceived marginal revenue is 
generally not equal to the industry’s marginal revenue. In fact, the perceived marginal 
revenue for bank i equals ( )iP hλ+   . The range of possible values of the conjectural 
variation elasticity λi is given by (0,1). In the special case of the Cournot behavior, 
, and λ/ iQ q∂ ∂ =1 i is simply the output share of the ith bank. In the case of perfect 
competition, λi = 0; under pure monopoly, λi =1; and, finally, λi < 0 would imply pricing 
below marginal cost and could result, for example, from a non-optimizing behavior of 
banks. Clearly, aggregation implies that the average value of λi across all banks equals the 
industry’s conjectural elasticity, defined as L, the latter having the same properties as λi. 
Thus, this framework provides a benchmark, which can be used to identify the actual 
underlying market structure.  
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2.2. The revenue test (RT) 
The PR (1987) approach (initially developed by Rosse and Panzar, 1977) for 
measuring market power relies on the premise that each bank will employ a different 
pricing strategy in response to a change in input costs, depending on the market structure in 
which this bank operates. In other words, market power is measured by the extent to which 
changes in factor prices (unit price of funds, capital, and labor) are reflected in revenue. 
The authors define a measure of competition, the H-statistic, as the sum of the elasticities of 
the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices. Thus, the H-statistic 
represents the percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from an infinitesimal 
percent increase in the price of all factors used by the firm.  
Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that this statistic can reflect the structure and 
conduct of the market to which the firm belongs. They assert that the H-statistic is negative 
when the competitive structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a 
conjectural variations short-run oligopoly; an increase in input prices will increase marginal 
costs, reduce equilibrium output, and subsequently reduce revenue.4 Under perfect 
competition, where banks’ products are regarded as perfect substitutes of one another, the 
Chamberlinian model, based on free entry of banks and determining not only the output 
level but also the equilibrium number of banks, produces the perfectly competitive solution, 
as demand elasticity approaches infinity. Thus, in this case, the H-statistic is equal to unity. 
Shaffer (1982) shows that the H-statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a 
perfectly contestable market and also for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject to 
                                                 
4 In the case where the monopolist faces a demand curve of constant price elasticity (i.e. e > 1) and where a 
constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas technology is employed, Panzar and Rosse proved that H is equal to 
e-1. Hence, apart from the sign, the magnitude of H may also be of importance, as H yields an estimate of the 
Lerner index of monopoly power L = (e-1)/e = H/(H-1) (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
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breakeven constraints. Consequently, an increase in input prices raises both marginal and 
average costs without altering the optimal output of a bank. Exit from the market will 
evenly increase the demand faced by each of the remaining banks, thereby leading to an 
increase in prices and total revenue by the same amount as the rise in costs (i.e. demand is 
perfectly elastic). Finally, if the H-statistic is between zero (inclusive) and unity 
(exclusive), the market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition. Under 
monopolistic competition, potential entry leads to contestable market equilibrium, and 
income increases less than proportionally to the input prices, as the demand for banking 
products facing individual banks is inelastic.  
When applying the RT to assess banks’ market conduct, various assumptions about 
banks’ production activity have to be made. First, the methodology requires assuming that 
banks are treated as single-product firms, producing intermediation services by using labor, 
physical capital, and financial capital as inputs. Second, one needs to assume that higher 
input prices are not associated with higher quality services that may generate higher 
revenue, since such a correlation may bias the computed H-statistic. Yet, if one rejects the 
hypothesis of a contestable competitive market, this bias cannot be too large (Molyneux et 
al., 1996). Among other underlying assumptions inherent in the PR model, we can mention 
that: (a) banks are profit-maximizing firms; (b) the performance of these banks needs to be 
influenced by the actions of other market participants; (c) the cost structure is 
homogeneous; and (d) the price elasticity of demand is greater than unity (see also De 
Bandt and Davis, 2000). Finally, a limitation of the RT is that any monopsony power or 
upward-sloping aggregate supply curve of any essential input (such as deposits) would 
render econometric identification an issue. Monopsony power, by tending to drive up input 
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prices (and hence equilibrium revenues) as a function of scale, would tend to yield higher 
values of H and thereby mask any market power present on the output side, in contrast to 
the CPM (Shaffer, 2004). 
Despite these assumptions, the RT is a valuable tool in assessing market conditions, 
mainly owing to its simplicity and transparency, without lacking efficiency. Moreover, data 
availability becomes much less of a constraint, since revenue is more likely to be 
observable compared to output prices. Also, by utilizing bank-level data, this approach 
allows for bank-specific differences in the production function. In addition, the non-
necessity to define the location of the market a priori implies that the potential bias caused 
by the misspecification of market boundaries is avoided; hence for a bank that operates in 
more than one market, the H-statistic will reflect the average of the bank’s conduct in each 
market.5
 
3. Empirical specification 
This section aims to identify robust econometric procedures for applying both non-
structural models of market power described above. As Bresnahan (1989) states, only 
econometric problems, not fundamental theoretical problems, could cloud inference on the 
empirical results of these models. To this end, the econometric methodology to be followed 
is afforded particular consideration.  
 
3.1. CPM 
                                                 
5 Owing to the reasons described above the revenue test has been extensively applied to the banking industry. 
For a thorough review see Mamatzakis et al. (2005). 
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The general empirical problem in studies relying on a CPM is the identification of 
the elasticity concept L. Using the results of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), Shaffer 
(1999) suggests a structural econometric model that combines separate demand and supply 
functions including cross-equation restrictions. A necessary and sufficient condition for the 
identification of L is that the demand function must not be separable in at least one 
exogenous variable that is excluded from the marginal cost function. Following this view, 
we specify the following linear demand function: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6Q a a P a Y a Z a PY a PZ a YZ= + + + + + +         (4)  
where Y is an exogenous variable that affects demand. Such a demand function, which 
includes three cross-product terms to improve flexibility,6 can be interpreted as a first order 
local approximation of the true aggregate demand function. The exogenous variable Z is 
critical for the solution of the identification problem and is generally chosen as the price of 
a substitute. Notice that the demand function is specified at the aggregate level. Since we 
are considering the single product case,  is well defined.iiQ = ∑ q 7   
Turning to the supply side of the model, we follow Shaffer (1999) who specifies a 
marginal cost function out of a generalization of the minflex Laurent functional form 
(which in turn is a generalization of a standard translog cost function) as follows:  
[ ] 521 4 5 0 1 2
3
/( ) [ ln (ln ) ln ]ii i
ji
CP L Q Y a Z b b q b q b
q
α α ω−
=
= − + + + + + +∑i j ij
                                                
        (5)  
 
6 Applications of the Bresnahan-Lau method in the banking industry have favored linear demand functions 
with one or two cross-product terms (Shaffer, 1999; Toolsema, 2002; etc.). Sjoberg (2004) uses a log-linear 
demand function, with one cross-product term (namely price of output times the exogenous variable), while 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) use a log-linear demand function with a number of explanatory variables, mainly 
corresponding to the quality of loans. We too have undertaken a log-linear demand function; however the 
changes in the coefficients on L are negligible.  
7 Given that data on a substitute price of individual banks are really hard to find (one would require bank-level 
data on the price of securities) we opt for an aggregate demand function. 
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Regarding the functional form imposed on the supply relation, the differentiation in 
the literature is broader than in the respective one imposed on the demand relation. 
According to the purpose of each study, the cost function has been given a linear, minflex 
Laurent, translog, generalized Leontief, or Fourier functional form. The appropriate choice 
rests on the assumptions of each study, the number of outputs specified, and the level of 
flexibility required. We have relied on the generalization of the minflex Laurent since, as 
Barnett and Lee (1985) suggest, even though models produced from second order Taylor 
series expansions (such as the translog and the generalized Leontief) can be rendered both 
flexible and regular at the median data point, that regularity usually quickly disappears as 
the recent-periods boundary of time series datasets is approached. The minflex Laurent 
model also can be rendered both flexible and regular at the median data point. However, 
doing so with this function assures simultaneously that the model’s region of regular 
behavior actually expands as the recent period boundary is approached. As a result, with 
time series (and hence with panel) data, the minflex Laurent possesses substantial 
advantages over the Taylor series specifications for conventional modeling purposes.8  
Most of the usual properties of a cost function pose no specific requirements for the 
parameters of the above supply equation. Symmetry and concavity do not involve any of 
the coefficients,9 while monotonicity involves but does not constrain the coefficients on the 
input prices. The property of linear homogeneity in factor prices implies . We 
tested for linear homogeneity after performing the regressions; however, in all models the 
3
1
0j
j
b
=
=∑
                                                 
8 For the transformation of the minflex Laurent model to our partially restricted Laurent specification and its 
advantages, see Shaffer (1999). 
9 Symmetry in the coefficients of output is irrelevant as we consider the one-output case. Symmetry in the 
coefficients of inputs would be necessary if we estimated different parameters for a pair of cross-product 
terms of the flexible functional form. Here we rely on estimation of the marginal cost function.  
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above hypotheses are not rejected at the 5 per cent level. Therefore, we do not impose any 
initial restrictions. Finally, note that the measurement of the term , as well as the 
dependent variable at the bank level, while not consistent with the profit-maximizing 
solution (since a quantity game was considered), allows for heterogeneity in marginal costs 
and in the price setting policy, respectively (on this issue see Tsutsui and Uchida, 2002 and 
Sjoberg, 2004).  
/iC qi
For L to be correctly specified in Eq. (5) it is necessary to treat the input prices as 
exogenously given. This assumption seems reasonable, at least as far as the markets for 
labor and physical capital are concerned, because banks face intense competition for these 
inputs from other banks as well as non-bank firms. The market for funds will also be 
treated as competitive based on the argument that depositors today have many other 
tempting saving options (such as government and corporate bonds and the stock markets), 
which exert a competitive pressure upon banks’ deposit rate policy. To the extent that this 
is not true, i.e. that bank have some degree of market power in the deposit market, it has 
been shown (Shaffer, 1999) that this will not escape identification and that it will simply be 
misattributed to the asset side (consequently L will be strengthened).  
For empirical implementation purposes, the CPM has to be embedded within a 
stochastic framework. Thus, we assume that Eqs. (4) and (5) are stochastic owing to errors 
in optimization. Introducing the additive disturbance terms in System {(4), (5)}, the latter is 
specified as: 
[ ]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5
2
1 4 5 0 1 2
3
/( ) [ ln (ln ) ln ]
t t t t t t t t t t t
it
it t t t it it j jit it
jit
Q a a P a Y a Z a PY a PZ a Y Z
CP L Q Y a Z b b q b q b u
q
ε
α α ω−
=
= + + + + + + +
= − + + + + + + +∑
         (6) 
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The disturbance vectors ε and u are assumed to be iid as multivariate N ~ (0, Σ), where Σ is 
a positive definite matrix.  
As discussed previously, equations in the latter system are interrelated, because of 
the underlying CPM, through the endogeneity of the semi-elasticity of market demand, 
which appears in the supply equation. Thus, we should employ a system estimator such as 
nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM)10 or 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML). We have applied all three methodologies, 
with the results being similar, yet we have resorted to the 3SLS method (as most of the 
relevant literature) for two main reasons. First, the FIML estimator is the asymptotically 
efficient estimator only under the assumption of normally distributed residuals (see 
Amemiya, 1977). We tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera statistic, which is 
significant at the 1 per cent level, thus ruling against normality. Second, use of different 
instruments does not significantly alter the results in the 3SLS case, while in the GMM case 
the variability is larger. Therefore, we proceed with the estimation of System (6) using a 
3SLS procedure. 
A crucial feature of the CPM is that the variables involved are usually characterized 
by short-run dynamics, which are not accounted for in the static equations. Further, a 
reformulation of the static model to a dynamic one may help with the inference problem 
when using non-stationary data or when severe autocorrelation in the demand equation is 
present (Toolsema, 2002). Steen and Salvanes (1999) developed a dynamic version of the 
Bresnahan and Lau model, based on an error-correction (ECM) framework. They applied it 
to the French market for fresh salmon, using time series data. Toolsema (2002) opted for 
applying this model to the Dutch consumer credit market. However, multicollinearity in the 
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demand equation and difficulty in identifying a purely exogenous Z variable (so as the 
demand function will not be separable in Z) are problems that she could not overcome, thus 
failing to estimate the model. We have closely followed her approach and indeed 
multicollinearity seems to be a major problem when using time series data.  
Given the above, we opt for the following dynamic representation of the demand 
equation (autoregressive-distributed lag model):  
0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1
4 4 1 5 5 1 6 6 1    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
t l t t l t t l t t l t
t l t t l t t l t t
Q a a Q a P a P a Y a Y a Z a Z
a PY a PY a PZ a PZ a YZ a YZ ε
− − − −
− −
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
−
                                                                                                                                                 
        (7) 
which is derived as a static conditional demand equation, assuming the same technology as 
in the static case and with dynamics resulting from an AR(1) disturbance.11 As we do not 
impose the implied common factor restrictions, the dynamics may be thought of as an 
empirical approximation to some more general adjustment process (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). This is equivalent to identifying the short-run relationships, which are of main 
interest in this study.12  
Similarly, we specify the dynamic supply equation of the CPM as:  
5
* * 2
, 1 0 , 1 0 1 2
3
5
2
, 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1
3
[ ln (ln ) ln ]
       [ ln (ln ) ln ]
it it l i t i t it it it j itj
j
i t l l i t l i t jl ji t it
jl
P LQ L Q P c b b q b q b
c b b q b q b u
λ ω
ω
−
− −
=
−
− − − −
=
= − − + + + + + +
+ + + +
∑
∑
               (8) 
10 Reference here is made to the GMM estimator developed by Hansen (1982). 
11 To decide that lag length is equal to 1, we used the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (Ljung and Box, 1979). The 
results ensured that no serial correlation was present in the residuals (the maximum lag length used was 3). 
Indeed, we did not expect a higher order autocorrelation due to the use of annual data. 
12 Alternatively, we may rely on an ECM specification (as in Steen and Salvanes, 1999), which could allow 
distinction between the long- and short-run effects. However, this (i) would preferably require panel 
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where , , and c* 1 4 5/( )t t t tQ Q Y a Zα α= + +
*
1 1 1 4 1 5/( )t t t tQ Q Y a Zα α− − − −= + + 1
                                                                                                                                                 
it = Cit / qit.13 Eq. 
(8) is non-linear in its parameters and therefore requires a non-linear estimation procedure. 
Since we cannot simultaneously estimate the System {(7), (8)} (a non-linear system 
estimator for dynamic panels is not available) we proceed in two steps. First, to account for 
the simultaneity problem, Eq. (7) is estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS), as in 
Steen and Salvanes (1999), with input prices and a time trend as instruments. In order to 
test the validity of these instruments we used a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, 
whose statistic has an approximately chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of instruments minus the number of regressors. The statistic rejects the 
hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions at the 10 per cent level of significance (p-value = 
0.203).  
Then, after having calculated Q* and its lag, we estimate Eq. (8). As discussed 
above, the supply equation is estimated using panel data. Estimation of a dynamic panel 
data model in the supply equation may still present considerable robustness problems due 
to the non-stationarity of the variables involved and the possible existence of cointegrating 
relationships between them.14 We cannot robustly test for stationarity here, nor use panel 
cointegration techniques, owing to the small time dimension of the panel. For consistent 
and efficient estimates of the supply equation we apply the system GMM approach 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator 
cointegration techniques, which are difficult to apply here because of the relatively small time dimension of 
the panel, (ii) is more demanding in terms of degrees of freedom, and (iii) is not directly comparable to the 
dynamic Panzar-Rosse model described below. 
13 Again the Ljung-Box Q-statistic ensures serial correlation of order not higher than 1. 
14 Binder et al. (2003) and Baltagi (2005), among others, suggest that in panels with a small time dimension 
and a larger cross-sectional dimension (which is usually the case in the relevant literature), instrumental 
variables and GMM estimators based only on standard orthogonality conditions break down if the underlying 
time series contain unit roots. 
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combines the T-2 equations in differences with the T-2 equations in levels into a single 
system. It uses the lagged levels of dependent and independent variables as instruments for 
the difference equation and the lagged differences of dependent and independent variables 
as instruments for the level equation. This estimation procedure is especially appropriate 
when: (i) the cross sectional dimension is large compared to the time dimension of the 
panel; (ii) some explanatory variables are endogenous; and (iii) unobserved bank-specific 
effects are correlated with other regressors; all three criteria are relevant in the present 
analysis. Also, this estimator does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof 
see Binder et al., 2003). We choose the two-step estimator, since it is asymptotically more 
efficient than the respective one-step estimator, and we account for its downward bias by 
using the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer 
(2000). We use Z and a linear time trend as “GMM-style” instruments (for a discussion see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
To determine whether our instruments are valid in the system GMM approach, we 
use the specification tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995). First, we apply the Sargan test, a test of over-identifying restrictions, to determine 
any correlation between instruments and errors. For an instrument to be valid, there should 
be no correlation between the instrument and the error terms. The null hypothesis is that the 
instruments and the error terms are independent. Thus, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
could provide evidence that valid instruments are used. Second, we test whether there is a 
second order serial correlation with the first differenced errors. The GMM estimator is 
consistent if there is no second order serial correlation in the error term of the first-
differenced equation. The null hypothesis in this case is that the errors are serially 
 16
uncorrelated. Thus, failure to reject the null hypothesis could supply evidence that valid 
orthogonality conditions and instruments are used. 
 
3.2. RT 
As in Shaffer (2004) we derive the H-statistic using the following specification of 
the reduced-form revenue equation for a panel dataset: 
0 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4ln ln ln ln lnit it it it it itTR w w w TAβ β β β β= + + + + + ε   (9) 
where it is the subscript indicating bank i at time t, TR stands for a bank’s real total 
revenue, w1, w2 and w3 are the three input prices, and TA stands for real total assets. The log 
specification is used to improve the regression’s goodness of fit and to reduce possible 
simultaneity bias (De Bandt and Davis, 2000). Molyneux et al. (1996) found that a log-
linear revenue equation gives results similar to those of a more flexible translog equation. 
The revenue equation is interpreted as a reduced form rather than as a structural equation 
(Shaffer, 2004). 
As discussed above, the H-statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of total 
revenue with respect to the three input prices, i.e. H = β1 + β2 + β3. The H-statistic is 
interpreted here as a continuous measure of the level of competition, in particular ranging 
between 0 and 1, with higher values of the statistic indicating stronger competition. This 
does not follow automatically from the Panzar and Rosse (1987) study, which concentrates 
only on testing the hypotheses H = 0 (or more precisely H ≤ 0) and H = 1. However, it can 
be shown that under stronger assumptions (in particular under the assumption of a constant 
price elasticity of demand across banks) our interpretation of the H-statistic is correct. The 
Chamberlinian equilibrium model provides a simple link between the H-statistic and the 
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number of banks, and thus between market behavior and market structure. Vesala (1995) 
proves that the H-statistic is an increasing function of the demand elasticity e, that is, the 
less market power is exercised, the higher the H-statistic becomes. This implies that the H-
statistic is not used solely to reject certain types of market behavior, but that its magnitude 
serves as a measure of competition. One of the general assumptions underlying the 
Chamberlinian equilibrium model mentioned above is that e is a non-decreasing function of 
the number of rival banks. Vesala’s result, together with this latter assumption, provides a 
positive (theoretical) relationship between H and the number of banks, or – in a looser 
interpretation – an inverse relationship between H and banking concentration. Hence, the 
more negative the H-statistic is, the larger is the monopoly markup, while the closer the H-
statistic is to unity, the more competitive is the market (Vesala, 1995; Barajas et al., 2000).  
 Input prices are measured as in the CPM. As regards TA, a positive coefficient is 
expected, as a higher volume of output envisages greater revenue. Furthermore, causation 
may run from TR to assets if bank managers tend to retain marginal changes in earnings 
rather than distributing them to shareholders, thus raising assets, or if banks that expect to 
have better performance credibly transmit this information through expansion of the asset 
base. Therefore, TA should be treated as an endogenous variable and, consequently, an 
instrumental variable panel data estimation method is required. We resort to a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) procedure under a random effects (RE) model.15
The dynamic extension of the Panzar-Rosse model is less demanding than the 
equivalent CPM, since it is linear in the parameters and does not require system estimation. 
Following Bond (2002), we specify an autoregressive-distributed lag model of the form:   
                                                 
15 The suitability of a RE model was tested against a fixed effects (FE) model, using a Hausman test. The 
results showed that the difference in coefficients is not systematic, thus providing evidence against FE. 
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0 , 1 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4ln ln ln ln ln lnit l i t it it it it itTR TR w w w TAβ β β β β β−= + + + + + +ε
1 2 3H
       (10) 
where  is the lagged dependent variable in a logarithmic form. Once again, the H-
statistic is obtained as '
, 1ln i tTR −
' ' 'β β β= + +
, 3 ,1ln ,..., ln  
. Persistence in revenue may reflect impediments to 
product market competition, generating market power in output markets as well as better 
forecasting of industry and/or macroeconomic developments (for a related discussion on 
the persistence of bank profits, see Berger et al., 2000).   
Eq. (10) is estimated using the dynamic panel data estimation method proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The instruments used are 
 , 2 , 3 ,1 , 2 , 3 ,1 , 2ln , ln ,..., ln ; ln , ln ,..., ln ; ln ,i t i t i i t i t i ji tTR TR TR TA TA TA w− − − − − ji t jiw w−
−
and 
. Note that lnTA is specified as an endogenous variable, being 
instrumented in “GMM style” and symmetrically to the dependent variable lnTR (see Bond, 
2002). 
, 2 , 2ln , lni t i tTR TA−Δ Δ
A critical feature of the H-statistic is that the test must be undertaken on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium. The empirical test for equilibrium is justified 
on the grounds that competitive capital markets will equalize the risk-adjusted rate of 
returns across banks, so that, in equilibrium, rates of return should not be correlated 
statistically with input prices. Therefore, to test for equilibrium, one can calculate the H-
statistic (Hn) using the rates of return, instead of total revenue, as the dependent variable in 
the regression equation. All authors use a regression relating return on assets to input 
prices. However, the argument also holds if the return on equity is used as the dependent 
variable instead (Molyneux et al., 1996; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002; Bikker and Haaf, 
2002). A value of Hn < 0 would show non-equilibrium, whereas Hn = 0 would prove 
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equilibrium. However, if the sample is not in long-run equilibrium, it is true that H < 0 no 
longer proves monopoly, but it remains also true that H > 0 disproves monopoly or 
conjectural variation short-run oligopoly (Shaffer, 2004).  
 
4. Data description and analysis 
4.1. An overview of the Greek banking industry 
Since the mid-1990s, the Greek financial and banking landscape has changed 
rapidly as a result of the new regulatory framework characterizing the market. In 2004, 
there were 62 credit institutions operating in Greece, a figure much higher than that 
observed in 1990, when only 39 credit institutions were in operation (Bank of Greece, 
2006). The environment that emerged after 1993 gave impetus to the establishment and 
operation of new credit institutions, either domestic ones or branches of foreign banks. 
Foreign presence concentrated mainly in niche markets, specializing in areas such as 
shipping and corporate finance, private and personal banking, asset management, and 
capital market activities. In addition, in 1993 the Bank of Greece set the operational and 
supervisory framework concerning cooperative credit institutions, resulting in banks of 
this type getting established. 
Thus, as of 2004, the Greek banking system comprises 21 Greek commercial banks, 
23 foreign-owned banks (which constitute a subgroup of commercial banks), 16 
cooperative banks, and 2 specialized credit institutions. Commercial banks incorporated in 
Greece have been the dominant group in the banking system. Indeed, these credit 
institutions hold a high market share, both in terms of assets (81 per cent), as well as in 
terms of loans (85 per cent) and deposits (82 per cent). On the other hand, the market share 
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of foreign-owned banks stands at 10 per cent in terms of assets (9 per cent and 8 per cent 
for loans and deposits respectively), while the market share of the cooperative credit 
institutions remains very low (less than 1 per cent of aggregate balance sheet figures). 
The dominance of commercial banking can also be confirmed by the number of branches 
and employees. As of end 2004, Greek commercial banks have 2,953 branches in operation 
(out of 3,403 for all credit institutions), while the number of their employees stands at 
51,741 (out of 59,337 employed in all credit institutions) (Bank of Greece, 2006).  
A specific structural feature of the status quo ante of the Greek financial system, 
characterizing in particular the old banking regime, was the significant level of state 
intervention, which for a long time hindered competition and created a distorted market 
environment. Indeed, in the early 1990s, the state commercial banks controlled around 85 
per cent of total commercial banking operations. Since then, a notable trend observed in the 
Greek banking sector was the privatization of several banks controlled by the Greek state, 
contributing to the enhancement of competition in the market. In the process, the number 
of directly or indirectly state-controlled banks16 was reduced significantly, from 10 in 1993 
to only 2 in 2004.17  
While the number of commercial banks operating in the Greek banking system 
remained almost unchanged since 1993, the number of those banks’ branches and 
employees has increased significantly (see Table 1). During this period, a number of new, 
mainly small, commercial banks opened and a series of mergers and acquisitions were 
                                                 
16 The indirect control comes from the majority equity participation of public pension funds, municipalities 
and other funds, or from equity holdings of other state-owned or state-controlled banks. 
17 The largest credit institution, the National Bank of Greece, has come to a large degree into non-state 
ownership, and may be considered to operate largely on private economy criteria, while the fifth largest bank, 
Emporiki Bank (also known as Commercial Bank of Greece), is in the process of disentanglement of the 
Greek state. 
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undertaken, altering the level of bank concentration and substantially changing the structure 
of the Greek banking system. Specifically, especially during the first half of the 1990s, new 
private-owned foreign commercial banks were established, taking advantage of new 
products and services that were not available in the Greek market just a decade ago. Later 
on, other Greek commercial banks were established, primarily focusing on retail banking. 
Moreover, since the mid 1990s, several Greek banks have been involved into mergers and 
acquisitions, in order to become more efficient and obtain a size that would enable them 
to increase or, at least, maintain their domestic market shares, facilitate their access to 
international financial markets, and exploit any possible economies of scale. Most of 
them concerned the domestic market, including not only banks but also non-bank 
financial enterprises. Some large credit institutions opted to merge with their subsidiaries 
with a view to restructuring their activities and cutting back on their operating expenses.  
These mergers and acquisitions have reversed the downward trend observed in 
bank concentration during the previous decade. The market share of the 5 largest credit 
institutions reached 65 per cent in terms of balance sheet aggregates in 2004 (being in 
similar and higher levels in the period 2001-2003), up from 57 per cent in 1997 (Bank of 
Greece, 2006). Similar are the conclusions if we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).18 Its value stands at 1,069 in 2004, up from 885 in 1997. In any case, both 
concentration ratios characterizing the Greek banking sector are much higher than the 
average European levels (the share of the 5 largest credit institutions stands, on average, 
at 40 per cent, while the HHI index reaches 569 in 2004) (European Central Bank, 2004, 
2005).   
                                                 
18 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is defined as the sum of squares of the market shares of all banks in 
the particular banking market. 
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Even though the Greek banking system is characterized by a relatively high degree 
of market concentration, the five larger Greek commercial banks would be classified as 
mid-size by European standards; only the first two banks are included among the top 100 
European banks, while none in the top 150 credit institutions at a global level (Bank of 
Greece, 2005). This is principally due to the limited size of the domestic credit market and 
the absence of significant presence abroad.  
To compete in the new financial landscape and strengthen their position in the 
market, Greek commercial banks are transforming themselves into financial groups, (i) 
adding subsidiaries such as insurance companies, brokerages, credit card companies, 
mutual fund firms, factoring companies and finance houses, so as to offer additional 
services, and (ii) expanding their activities abroad, principally to the South Eastern 
European region (Albania, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro, and recently Turkey), via subsidiaries or through the 
establishment of branches. This latter trend signifies that Greek banks in the region have 
some comparative advantage, in the form either of access to capital markets, or of superior 
organization, know-how, and good understanding of local conditions. 
The above-mentioned developments in the structure of the Greek banking system 
resulted in significant modifications in the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. 
More notably, the ratio of net interest income to average total assets (i.e. the net interest 
margin) of Greek commercial banks increased considerably during the examined period, 
raising from 1.57 per cent in 1993 to 2.80 per cent in 2004.19 Also, the proportion of 
                                                 
19 Initially, net interest income was low, compared to other EU countries, mainly owing to the portfolio 
structure of the credit institutions (high proportion of public securities and cash and balance with central 
banks). Since then, banks’ balance sheets have been restructured to make their financial positions sounder. 
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loans to total assets reached 63 per cent at 2004 (compared to 24 per cent in 1993), 
catching up rapidly with the average European levels.20  
 The high proportion of operating expenses is related to the specific features of the 
Greek banking system, such as the high number of branches of large banks and the fact that 
the products offered are relatively limited (Hondroyiannis et al., 1999). However, although 
Greek banks' operating expenses relative to their average total assets remain above the 
average European figures, they fell from 2.9 per cent to 2.3 per cent between 1996 and 
2004. During this period, Greek credit institutions took important steps towards improving 
their efficiency by deploying modern information technology systems, cutting down on 
their operating costs and improving their organizational structure, while extending their 
scope of business by offering new products and services. Finally, Greek banks have 
increased their levels of loan loss provisions, mainly by reason of the significant credit 
expansion. Taking into account these developments, indications of a long-term downward 
trend in profitability will be observed, evident from the beginning of liberalization (towards 
the end of the 1980s) onwards (Gibson, 2005). 
 
4.2. Data 
The models specified above are used in order to examine the level of competition 
in the Greek banking industry during the period 1993-2004. All bank-level data are taken 
from Balance Sheet Accounts and Income Statements published annually by the Greek 
                                                 
20 Several factors have been responsible for the high rates of growth of bank lending, including the relatively-
high rate of growth of the Greek economy, the convergence of Greek lending rates to those in the rest of the 
euro area, the enhancement of competition among credit institutions, especially with regard to extending credit 
to households, and the release of commercial bank funds from the Bank of Greece due to the harmonization of 
reserve requirements in the Eurosystem. 
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banks included in the sample. The macroeconomic data (national income and Greek 
Treasury bond rates) were drawn from Eurostat and the Bank of Greece. 
Our sample covers all Greek commercial banks, plus a foreign-owned credit 
institution, namely Bank of Cyprus. The institutions that do not publish profit and loss 
statements, i.e. branches of foreign banks and certain specialized credit institutions, are 
not included in the sample.21 Specialized credit institutions and smaller cooperative banks 
are also excluded from the analysis, since (i) their operations differ substantially from those 
of the mainstream commercial banks and (ii) sometimes they have a different legal form. 
Last, we omit investment banks and banks focusing in corporate banking, since they fail to 
meet the criterion of being a well-rounded commercial banking institution (universal credit 
institution). The number of credit institutions included in the sample ranges from 13 to 23 
commercial banks in each year of the examined period (see Table 2). In all examined 
years, the banks included in the sample accounted for a significant proportion of total 
banking assets (around 80 per cent).  
The output variable in the CPM (namely Q when referring to the industry’s total 
output and q when referring to the individual bank’s output) is defined as the value of 
total bank assets in real terms (in million euros). The unit price of output (namely P at the 
market level and p at the bank level) is measured as interest income over total assets. The 
choice of cost, price and output variables follows either the intermediation or the 
production approach. According to the intermediation approach, banks are considered as 
financial intermediaries that combine deposits together with purchased inputs to produce 
bank assets. Total cost includes interest expenses and operating expenses, i.e. staff costs 
                                                 
21 According to the Greek law governing the operation of corporations, foreign banks operating branches in 
Greece are not required to publish full-blown annual financial statements for their branch operations in Greece 
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and administrative expenses. In the alternative production approach, banks utilize capital 
and labor inputs to produce outputs of loans and deposit accounts. In this paper we follow 
the intermediation approach. The three input variables are defined as follows: 
 Labor (L): Defined as total number of employees. 
 Physical capital (K): Defined as fixed assets, including tangible fixed assets (land, 
lots, buildings and installations, furniture, office equipment, etc., less depreciation), as 
well as intangible fixed assets (goodwill, software, restructuring expenses, research 
and development expenses, minority interests, formation expenses, underwriting 
expenses, etc).  
 Total intermediated funds (F): Include current accounts, savings accounts, time 
deposits, repurchase agreements, as well as alternative funding sources (e.g. retail 
bonds). 
The unit prices of the three respective inputs (w1, w2, and w3) are defined as follows: 
 Unit price of labor (w1): Ratio of personnel expenses to total labor. Personnel 
expenses include wages and salaries, social security contributions, contributions to 
pension funds, and other staff-related expenses. 
 Unit price of funds (w2): Ratio of interest expenses to total funds. Interest expenses 
include interest paid on deposits and other sources of funds. 
 Unit price of physical capital (w3): Ratio of administrative expenses to fixed assets. 
Administrative expenses include rents, service charges, security, information systems 
and communications, other office and insurance expenses, professional charges, 
publicity and advertising, and depreciation. 
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Finally, regarding the RT, TR stands for real total revenue (this refers to real total operating 
income, which includes interest income, dividend income, fee and commission income, 
gains less losses from securities, and other operating income). In Table 3 we report banking 
indicators of the variables described above for the period 1993-2004. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In Tables 4-7 we present the empirical results of the static and dynamic CPM and 
RT. There are four pairs of columns in each table. In the first, we provide the results of the 
basic models, as described in Section 4. In the second, the real variables are replaced by 
nominal ones (in order to be consistent with the part of the literature that uses nominal 
variables), while in the third we include a quadratic time trend, to capture any trends in 
output prices and revenues in the CPM and RT, respectively. Finally, in the fourth pair of 
columns, we add time dummies for all years (time fixed effects), thus modifying the model 
to a three-way error component (see Baltagi, 2005). The time dummy specification is more 
general than the linear trend specification, as it will pick up potential trends of the variables 
used and more complex bank-level patterns.22 All these modifications are applied on a one-
by-one basis and not in a cumulative manner; so, for example, the modified model 
containing time dummies for every year does not also contain a trend, and the amounts it 
uses are real. The lag length in the dynamic models is set to one, which rejects 
autocorrelation; hence higher order autocorrelation is not accounted for in the regressions 
(this is expected given the fact that the data are annual). 
 
5.1. Static CPM 
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The results obtained by running the 3SLS estimation procedure on System (6) are 
presented in Table 4. The R-square statistics of both demand and supply relations, ranging 
from 0.89 to 0.96, indicate fine goodness of fit. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic reveals 
possible autocorrelation in the supply equation, which is a common problem in the 
literature (see Toolsema, 2002), whereas the DW statistic of the demand equation 
surprisingly rejects the hypothesis of serial correlation. All parameters of the demand 
relation were found to be statistically significant, which is a crucial factor in the 
identification of L (except the intercorrelation variable YZ when nominal amounts are 
used). In particular, the coefficient on P is negative and statistically significant, meaning 
that the demand function is decreasing in its own price, as expected. The negative sign on Y 
suggests that income refers to the ability to pay for the goods bought with consumer credit, 
in the sense that high income may imply less need for such credit (Toolsema, 2002). On the 
other hand the coefficient of the Greek government bond yield (Z) is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that our choice of Z is well suited as the price of a 
substitute.   
In the supply equation, the parameters were not all statistically significant, which 
may be due to the dynamic nature of output and inputs in banking (especially when we 
include time dummies most t-statistics decrease). The coefficient on the unit price of labor 
contrasts our expectations, a fact that may be due to the labor surplus in the beginning of 
the period examined and the gradual reduction in labor expenses by Greek banks in order to 
improve their operating efficiency. In contrast, the coefficients of the other two inputs have 
the expected sign.  
                                                                                                                                                 
22 The coefficients of the time dummies are not reported in the tables owing to space considerations. 
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 The estimate of market power, L, is very close to zero in all cases and the 
corresponding t-statistics are small, indicating that L is not significantly different from zero. 
Thus, the static CPM analysis specifies that the Greek banking market is characterized by 
perfect competition. This means that the high degree of concentration characterizing the 
Greek banking industry reflects the efforts by the most efficient banks to take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope and does not necessarily influence competition in a negative 
manner. This conclusion is different from the results of studies of market power in 
banking sectors of several European countries, which generally find evidence of 
monopolistic competition or collusive conduct. 
 
5.2. Dynamic CPM 
The results obtained by examining the dynamic CPM are presented in Table 5. 
Once again, as in the static model, the parameters in the demand equation are strongly 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of significance, the only exception being the 
coefficient of the cross-term PZ when nominal values are applied. The R-square statistic of 
the supply relation attains values slightly higher compared to that of the static CPM, which 
indicates that the dynamic model contains somewhat more information, especially for input 
prices. The Durbin-Watson statistic is also improved, verifying that the autocorrelated 
errors can be made to disappear by incorporating additional dynamics; as Kennedy (2003) 
states, modern econometric models typically have a rich dynamic structure and only 
seldom involve autocorrelated errors. The signs of the estimated coefficients are 
unchanged; however the t-statistics of both bank output and inputs (especially for w2) are 
strengthened. 
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The estimate of market power, L, is positive and close to zero (yet with a 
significantly higher t-statistic), except the one from the specification that includes time 
dummies. In the latter case, L is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of 
significance. This is a striking result since we cannot accept the interpretation of perfect 
competition as in the static CPM, meaning that some form of collusive behavior 
characterizes the Greek banking sector.23 Such an outcome may imply that the dynamics 
inherent in the use of bank-level data mask – to some extent – the market power exercised 
in the industry, a result effectively towards the same direction with the theoretical 
considerations of Corts (1999). To this end a dynamic CPM model may be a more 
appropriate specification.  
 
5.3. Static RT 
The competitive position tests of the static RT are presented in Table 6. In all 
models we include time dummies for the years 1999 and 2000 to account for the 
exceptional developments in the Greek stock market that took place during this period and 
led to a boom in bank revenues. The R-square statistic in all four estimated equations, 
ranging from 0.97 to 0.98, indicates fine goodness of fit. The coefficients on w1 and w3 are 
reported with the expected positive sign and they are statistically significant only when the 
trend or the time dummies are included in the specifications, a fact that provides evidence 
of improved stability of the equations. The coefficients on w2 and TA are always positive 
and statistically significant. 
                                                 
23 We run various robustness checks to verify this result, including a different estimation method and an ECM 
reformulation of the dynamic model as in Steen and Salvanes (1999).  
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The value of the H-statistic ranges from 0.214 (basic specification) to 0.605 (when 
time dummies are incorporated), and in all cases is statistically significant. The Wald test 
reveals that the H-statistic differs significantly from both zero and unity and, therefore, the 
hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition are rejected. Given the discussion in 
Sections 2 and 3, the dominant market form suggested by the static RT is monopolistic 
competition. Finally, we test for long-run equilibrium using the return on assets as the 
dependent variable. The Wald test performed does not reject the hypothesis of equilibrium 
(Hn = 0) at conventional statistical levels (x2 (4) = 52.93, p-value = 0.000), which implies 
that our analysis is well specified. 
 
5.4. Dynamic RT 
Table 7 presents the results of the dynamic RT model (Eq. 10). In this specification, 
the significance of the input prices falls compared to the static RT (only the coefficient on 
w2 is positive and statistically significant in the basic model and when nominal values are 
applied and the coefficient on w3 when time dummies are included in the specification). 
The effect of TA remains positive and statistically significant, TA attaining however lower 
values compared with the static RT. 
More importantly, we note that the value of the H-statistic is practically 
indistinguishable from zero in the cases of the basic model and its variant with nominal 
values, whereas in the models where time-related terms are added, either in the form of a 
time trend or in the form of time dummies, H departs from zero, attaining values around 
0.16. The hypothesis tests H = 1 and H = 0 show that perfect competition is rejected for 
every variant model, and that some form of collusive behavior cannot be rejected, 
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respectively (at the 5 per cent level of significance). The test for examining the existence of 
long-run equilibrium once again confirms the hypothesis of equilibrium at the 5 per cent 
level, even though the Wald test attains a lower value compared to the static case (x2 (4) = 
16.08, p-value = 0.003). 24
The signs found are consistent with the view that the CPM and RT offer similar 
conclusions regarding the structure of the Greek banking sector. Yet, both dynamic models 
indicate at least some anticompetitive behavior of banks, while their static counterparts 
point towards competitive conduct. These results have noteworthy implications for 
researchers and policy makers, as they challenge the dominant arguments regarding the 
structure of the Greek banking sector. One could elicit further information if these models 
were compared to a variety of differently structured banking systems or if they were 
extended to account for the critiques of the NEIO literature (e.g. Corts, 1999). Yet, before 
we move on to another issue we had better bring this entry to a close.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 Contrary to standard accounts, we have used both a CPM and a RT to assess 
competitive conditions in a specific banking industry. The analysis further distinguished 
between static and dynamic versions of these models in order to substantiate whether 
predictions regarding the market structure remained unchanged. We tested the four 
                                                 
24 We also included the lags of all independent variables (i.e. lagged input prices and lagged TA) in the model. 
Since an upward-sloping supply curve for bank inputs will have the effect of driving up input prices as a 
function of contemporaneous quantities of bank outputs, whereas the revenue levels predicted by the PR 
model may respond to input prices only with a lag, this may imply that inclusion of lagged input prices could 
help overcome the mask of monopoly power (see Shaffer, 2004). Yet, not only the estimation results were 
similar, but also the annual character of the data probably suggests that the preferred model is given by Eq. 
(10). 
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resulting specifications, using panel data from the Greek banking industry over the period 
1993-2004. 
 We contend that our results indicate that both static models tend to underestimate 
the level of market power. In particular, while the static CPM and RT indicate no 
anticompetitive conduct and monopolistic competition respectively, their dynamic 
counterparts signal some anticompetitive behavior of banks. This is especially true for the 
dynamic RT, and for the dynamic CPM when time dummy variables are included in its 
empirical specification. We may partially attribute the mask of market power by static 
models to the important dynamics that characterized the Greek banking sector during the 
examined period, which were not reflected in the empirical specifications of either the 
static CPM or the static RT. These results hold consistently across a number of econometric 
specifications and estimation methods, as applied separately to the static and dynamic 
models, enhancing some recent critiques regarding the suitability of static NEIO models to 
robustly estimate market power.  
 At a broader level of analysis the conclusions of the present article underline the 
crucial relevance of the special features of the examined banking industry and they 
highlight the need to develop more appropriate empirical methodologies to characterize the 
level of collusive behavior in banking.   
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Table 1 
An overview of Greek commercial banks 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
NCB 20 19 18 20 19 19 16 17 20 19 20 21 
NE 38 40 40 43 44 46 47 53 52 54 54 52 
NB 1,200 1,244 1,469 1,599 1,788 2,048 2,070 2,670 2,766 2,854 2,876 2,953 
NIM 1.57 1.36 2.09 1.98 2.25 2.42 2.70 2.69 2.67 2.42 2.72 2.80 
NoIM 2.18 2.85 2.15 2.22 2.21 1.92 3.74 2.16 1.50 0.91 0.96 0.90 
OEA 2.35 2.51 2.73 2.87 2.82 2.57 2.68 2.58 2.44 2.27 2.31 2.30 
LLP 0.34 0.38 0.23 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.64 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.49 0.60 
ROA 1.06 1.31 1.26 0.79 0.99 1.20 3.04 1.86 1.39 0.66 0.87 0.70 
LA 23.78 25.17 28.06 31.53 31.90 36.27 36.58 43.79 47.67 52.46 56.98 62.70 
EA 4.55 4.87 4.84 4.47 5.10 5.98 9.89 8.94 9.28 6.61 6.84 6.70 
 
This table reports some figures for Greek commercial banks over the period 1993-2004. NCB: number of 
Greek commercial banks; NE: number of employees (x1000); NB: number of branches; NIM: net interest 
margin i.e. net interest income to average assets (in percentage terms); NoIM: non-interest income to 
average assets (in percentage terms); OEA: operating expenses to average assets (in percentage terms); 
LLP: loan loss provisions to average assets (in percentage terms); ROA: return on assets (in percentage 
terms); LA: loan to assets (in percentage terms); EA: equity to assets (in percentage terms). 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, Bank Profitability – Financial 
Statements of Banks: 1994 – 2003, OECD, 2004 and Bank of Greece, Annual Report 2005, BoG, 2006.  
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Table 2 
The dataset 
Bank Name Years 
National Bank of Greece 1993-2004 
Alpha Bank 1993-2004 
Eurobank 1993-2004 
Agricultural Bank of Greece 1993-2004 
Emporiki Bank (aka Commercial Bank of Greece) 1993-2004 
Piraeus Bank 1993-2004 
Geniki Bank (aka General Bank of Greece) 1993-2004 
Egnatia Bank 1993-2004 
Bank of Attica 1993-2004 
Laiki Bank (formerly European Popular Bank) 1993-2004 
Aspis Bank 1993-2004 
NovaBank 2001-2004 
Probank 2002-2004 
Omega Bank 2001-2004 
Marfin Bank (formerly Crédit Lyonnais, Piraeus Prime) 1993-2004 
Panellinia Bank 2002-2004 
Telesis Bank (formerly Dorian Bank) 1993-2000 
Ergobank 1993-1999 
Ionian Popular Bank 1993-1999 
Bank of Macedonia-Thrace 1993-1999 
Xiosbank 1993-1999 
Cretabank 1993-1998 
Bank of Central Greece 1993-1998 
National Mortgage Bank 1993-1997 
Bank of Athens 1993-1997 
Interbank 1993-1996 
National Housing Bank 
Bank of Cyprus 
1993-1996 
1993-2004 
 
This table reports the Greek commercial banks constituting the sample (only one foreign-owned bank is 
included, namely Bank of Cyrpus). 
Source: Annual Balance Sheet and Income Statements of Greek Commercial Banks, 1993-2004.  
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Table 3 
Banking indicators 
Year  Q P Y Z C w1 w2 w3 TR
1993 2358.23 12.73 79771.30 22.75 295.84 19.312 12.634 5.671 317.06
1994 2316.54 13.37 76048.87 19.00 338.02 20.445 14.132 6.021 330.70
1995 2506.28 11.61 74386.21 15.60 330.27 22.304 15.475 5.771 298.25
1996 2545.69 10.77 74937.20 14.40 351.62 24.850 14.967 6.097 296.72
1997 2964.64 9.40 77622.13 9.90 379.47 28.460 11.982 6.622 316.09
1998 3351.22 9.39 75385.52 8.50 470.25 27.723 9.792 6.448 372.79
1999 4487.44 7.40 79429.47 6.30 572.75 30.253 5.390 7.179 495.64
2000 6504.77 7.38 80468.60 6.10 811.09 33.978 5.345 5.589 657.63
2001 6499.75 6.18 83255.77 5.30 620.04 36.878 4.220 5.571 493.34
2002 5840.03 4.69 86847.19 5.12 489.30 33.994 3.534 5.212 360.12
2003 6042.43 4.70 90822.54 4.27 458.04 35.376 3.001 5.220 352.57
2004 6318.65 4.64 95722.17 4.25 490.93 39.274 3.288 5.406 366.63
Average 4311.31 8.52 81224.75 10.12 467.30 29.404 8.647 5.901 388.13
 
Q represents total assets at the end of each year (in millions of euros); P is the ratio of annual interest income 
to total assets; Y is the gross domestic product (in billions of euros); Z is the 10-year Greek government bond 
yield (used as a substitute for bank deposits, in percentage units); C is total cost (in millions of euros); w1 is 
the quotient of personnel expenses per employee (in thousand of euros); w2 is the ratio of interest expense per 
total funds (in percentage units); w3 is the ratio of administrative expenses per fixed assets (in percentage 
units); TR is total revenue (in millions of euros). Each row represents the average bank in our set of banks for 
a particular year, with the exception of attributes Y and Z, which correspond to macroeconomic data. All 
variables expressed in monetary units are in real terms. 
Source: Annual Balance Sheet and Income Statements of Greek Commercial Banks, 1993-2004 and own 
estimations.  
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 Table 4 
Results (Static CPM) 
 Basic model Nominal values Trend Time dummies 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
α0 40566.1 16.70 32280.8 9.57 40524.5 13.91 40511.4 16.66 
P -10325.3 -14.01 -4983.8 -9.93 -10330.8 -8.88 -10303.5 -12.96 
Y -0.361 -13.28 -0.117 -5.17 -0.360 -10.65 -0.360 -13.14 
Z 4293.1 9.42 -1231.1 -3.70 4290.3 4.85 4270.0 8.75 
PY 0.122 13.33 0.033 8.95 0.122 8.10 0.122 12.00 
PZ 47.477 10.08 147.497 8.57 48.231 6.15 47.849 9.61 
YZ -0.063 -11.16 -0.003 -1.36 -0.063 -5.79 -0.062 -10.41 
R-sq 0.940 0.953 0.940 0.940 
DW 1.947 1.793 1.950 1.947 
L 0.012 1.32 0.001 0.42 0.006 0.81 0.107 0.83 
β0 199.88 3.01 129.04 3.49 116.38 3.98 97.52 2.07 
lnq -16.604 -1.48 -3.391 -0.75 -3.440 -0.77 3.649 0.66 
lnq-2 1.354 1.71 0.396 1.26 0.339 1.05 -0.020 -0.05 
lnw1 -38.509 -6.55 -14.274 -4.77 -14.453 -4.36 -4.328 -1.41 
lnw2 3.008 2.72 4.717 4.58 2.948 2.71 2.708 2.17 
lnw3 0.928 1.90 1.461 2.28 0.791 1.62 0.333 0.82 
t     0.250 2.57   
t2     -0.017 -2.26   
R-sq 0.901 0.906 0.898 0.893 
DW 1.628 1.503 1.497 1.487 
Obs 228 228 228 228 
 
 
The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the static CPM (System 6). q: total assets at the end 
of each year (in millions of euros); P: the ratio of annual interest income to total assets; Y: the gross domestic 
product (in billions of euros); Z: the 10-year Greek government bond yield (used as a substitute for bank 
deposits, in percentage units); w1: the ratio of personnel expenses per employee (in thousand of euros); w2: the 
ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w3: the ratio of administrative expenses per fixed 
assets (in percentage units). Coefficient estimates, with corresponding t-statistics for four variants of the 
model; R-sq: the R-squared value of the equation; DW: Durbin-Watson statistic; Obs: number of observations. 
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Table 5 
Results (Dynamic CPM) 
 Basic model Nominal values Trend Time dummies 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
α0 21872.6 11.17 17309.1 7.75 39442.2 18.49 20354.7 6.73 
αl 0.576 14.91 0.523 14.62 0.233 5.56 0.982 16.44 
P -9240.9 -16.73 -7626.7 -17.51 -10991.7 -23.35 -12820.2 -15.02 
Y -0.221 -11.06 -0.107 -8.09 -0.562 -17.56 -0.184 -5.96 
Z 5750.8 13.90 4709.6 12.51 5135.9 15.11 8773.9 13.72 
PY 0.119 17.44 0.068 19.98 0.141 24.21 0.167 15.81 
PZ 23.904 5.31 -3.612 -0.30 22.317 6.09 29.818 4.28 
YZ -0.081 -14.75 -0.044 -16.24 -0.068 -14.73 -0.124 -14.57 
R-sq 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.93 
DW 2.26 2.20 2.19 2.05 
L 0.008 1.65 0.012 1.92 0.004 1.68 0.143 2.70 
β0 307.19 7.66 135.32 3.54 245.12 5.64 240.10 5.51 
Lnq -18.387 -3.86 -3.702 -0.80 -5.224 -0.97 -7.551 -1.47 
Lnq-2 1.314 3.90 0.424 1.32 0.583 1.59 0.673 1.90 
lnw1 -20.374 -6.81 -20.696 -6.64 -14.268 -4.30 -14.498 -4.48 
lnw2 6.262 5.65 6.470 5.38 3.852 3.10 3.506 2.92 
lnw3 1.133 0.95 1.856 1.47 0.773 0.63 0.649 0.54 
t     -0.834 -0.88   
t2     -0.219 -0.65   
R-sq 0.931 0.908 0.918 0.930 
DW 1.618 1.500 1.529 1.703 
Sargan 0.315 0.223 0.329 0.416 
AR (1) 0.092 0.007 0.083 0.102 
AR (2) 0.179 0.123 0.214 0.233 
Obs 202 202 202 202 
 
The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the dynamic CPM (System 7 and 8). q: total assets at 
the end of each year (in millions of euros); P: the ratio of annual interest income to total assets; Y: the gross 
domestic product (in billions of euros); Z: the 10-year Greek government bond yield (used as a substitute for 
bank deposits, in percentage units); w1: the ratio of personnel expenses per employee (in thousand of euros); w2: 
the ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w3: the ratio of administrative expenses per 
fixed assets (in percentage units). Coefficient estimates, with corresponding t-statistics for four variants of the 
model; R-sq: the R-squared value of the equation; DW: Durbin-Watson statistic; Sargan: Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions (p-value); AR (1): test for first order serial correlation (p-value); AR (2): test for 
second order serial correlation (p-value); Obs: number of observations. 
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Table 6 
Results (Static RT) 
 Basic model Nominal values Trend Time dummies 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
β0 -1.788 -2.67 -2.031 -2.82 -7.803 -8.70 -9.002 -9.15 
lnw1 -0.076 -1.13 -0.006 -0.08 0.440 5.29 0.456 5.52 
lnw2 0.262 12.32 0.255 12.50 0.103 3.76 0.095 3.37 
lnw3 0.028 1.19 0.024 1.07 0.045 1.93 0.053 2.31 
lnTA 0.861 37.54 0.852 43.05 1.095 29.04 1.098 28.93 
D99 0.197 3.92 0.203 4.21 0.109 2.12   
D00 0.200 3.58 0.207 3.86 0.136 2.45   
t     0.627 3.83   
t2     -0.397 -6.46   
H 0.214 2.74 0.274 3.58 0.588 6.85 0.605 7.05 
H = 0 7.50 0.01 12.84 0.00 46.93 0.00 49.70 0.00 
H = 1 101.30 0.00 89.99 0.00 23.09 0.00 21.17 0.00 
FE 8.79 0.00 9.64 0.00 6.99 0.00 7.12 0.00 
R-sq 0.970 0.971 0.978 0.978 
Obs 228 228 228 228 
 
The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the static RT (Equation 9). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of total revenue scaled by total assets. w1: the ratio of personnel expenses per 
employee (in thousand of euros); w2: the ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w3: 
the ratio of administrative expenses per fixed assets (in percentage units); TA: total assets. Coefficient 
estimates, with corresponding t-statistics for four variants of the model. The H-statistic is equal to the sum 
of the elasticities of total revenue with respect to three input prices. The Wald test is used to test the H=0 
and H=1 hypotheses and follows an F-distribution. R-sq: the R-squared value of the equation; FE: test for 
fixed effects; Obs: number of observations. 
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Table 7 
Results (Dynamic RT) 
 Basic model Nominal values Trend Time dummies 
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
β0 0.023 0.02 0.147 0.12 -2.574 -2.22 -2.916 -2.34 
βl 0.469 7.99 0.459 7.64 0.283 4.33 0.307 4.59 
lnw1 -0.152 -1.61 -0.152 -1.57 0.078 0.79 0.069 0.70 
lnw2 0.158 3.29 0.152 3.23 0.046 0.94 0.028 0.56 
lnw3 0.005 0.15 0.001 0.03 0.044 1.45 0.060 2.00 
lnTA 0.480 8.30 0.481 8.19 0.702 10.09 0.681 9.72 
D99 0.229 4.42 0.225 4.38 0.142 2.74   
D00 0.232 4.37 0.226 4.30 0.180 3.69   
t     0.359 1.40   
t2     -0.215 -2.72   
H 0.011 0.08 0.001 0.01 0.168 1.35 0.157 1.24 
H = 0 0.010 0.94 0.000 0.99 1.830 0.18 1.550 0.21 
H = 1 55.40 0.00 54.81 0.00 44.57 0.00 44.48 0.00 
F-test 609.58 0.00 645.15 0.00 617.82 0.00 402.17 0.00 
Sargan 0.307 0.326 0.343 0.514 
AR (1) 0.023 0.017 0.004 0.014 
AR (2) 0.743 0.699 0.475 0.423 
Obs 202 202 202 202 
 
The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the dynamic RT (Equation 10). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of total revenue scaled by total assets. w1: the ratio of personnel expenses per 
employee (in thousand of euros); w2: the ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w3: the 
ratio of administrative expenses per fixed assets (in percentage units); TA: total assets. Coefficient estimates, 
with corresponding t-statistics for four variants of the model. The H-statistic is equal to the sum of the 
elasticities of total revenue with respect to three input prices. The Wald test is used to test the H=0 and H=1 
hypotheses and follows an F-distribution. R-sq: the R-squared value of the equation; Sargan: Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions (p-value); AR (1): test for first order serial correlation (p-value); AR (2): test for 
second order serial correlation (p-value); FE: test for fixed effects; Obs: number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
